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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

LORETO ROJAS SALGADO,
Defendant/Appellant.

: District Court Case No. 051902361
: Appellate Court No. 20060070-SC

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of two counts of Distribution of a
Controlled Substance, first degree felonies in violation of U.C.A. §58-378(l)(A)(ii) (2003). A jury found the Defendant guilty on November 18, 2005.
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a3(2)0(2003).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT 1
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HER RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1,
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH

CONSTITUTION BY HER ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO
MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a
matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective
assistance of counsel.

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d

674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which
was adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether
counsel was ineffective. The Court held that;
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 466
U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.

POINT II
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OR
AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTIONS
CASE FOR THE REASONS THAT THERE WAS
INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court should use a question of law
standard of review. "We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we
conclude as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant
conviction."

State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
2

Furthermore, this Court should review the evidence "in a light most favorable to
the jury verdict," State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), and reverse the
Defendant's conviction only if "the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the Defendant committed the crime." Smith, 972 P.2d at 651 (citations and
quotations omitted).

Since Defendant's attorney didn't move for a directed

verdict it should be reviewed under a plain error standard of review.

cc

[T]o

establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged
error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i)
an error exists, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii)
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for the appellant . . ." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1208 (Utah 1993).
POINT III
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS OR CONTINUE THE
TRIAL BASED UPON A VIOLATION OF UCA §77-17-13?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was properly preserved for appeal
by a motion for continuance, which was denied. (R. 139 / 4, 83-91) "A trial
court's decision to either grant or deny a continuance is clearly within its
discretion/5 The Appellate Court "will not disturb such decisions absent a clear
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abuse of discretion." State v. Tolano, 2001 UT App 37, Tf5, 19 P.3d 400 and State
v. Arellano, 964 P. 2d 1167, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). However, regarding the
issue as to prejudice to the Defendant, "the burden of establishing prejudice, is
shifted to the State" "Therefore to establish the prosecution's error was not
prejudicial, the State must persuade the court that there is no reasonable
likelihood that absent the prosecutor's error, the outcome would have been more
favorable for the defendant". State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Utah App.
1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSITUTION
Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
Article 1, Section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be
confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 17. The Trial. (Attached as Addendum C)
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Section 58-37-8 Distribution of a Controlled Substance (attached as Addendum
B)
Section 77-17-13. Expert testimony generally — Notice requirements.
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in a
felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held pursuant
to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party intending to call the
expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less
than 30 days before trial or ten days before the hearing.
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's
curriculum vitae, and one of the following:
(i)

a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or

5

(ii)

a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony sufficient to
give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the
testimony; and

(iii)

a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult with the
opposing party on reasonable notice.

(c) The party intending to call the expert is responsible for any fee charged
by the expert for the consultation.
(2) If an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in whole or part on the
results of any tests or other specialized data, the party intending to call the witness
shall provide to the opposing party the information upon request.
(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report or the information
concerning the expert's proposed testimony, the party receiving notice shall
provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom the party anticipates calling
to rebut the expert's testimony, including the information required under
Subsection (l)(b).
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with the
requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent
substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient
to allow preparation to meet the testimony.
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(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result of
bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate
sanctions. The remedy of exclusion of the expert's testimony will only apply if
the court finds that a party deliberately violated the provisions of this section.
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of the
expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by the expert
at the preliminary hearing.
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary hearing
shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae as
soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at which the expert may be called
as an expert witness.
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is an employee of
the state or its political subdivisions, so long as the opposing party is on
reasonable notice through general discovery that the expert may be called as a
witness at trial, and the witness is made available to cooperatively consult with
the opposing party upon reasonable notice.
Section 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(2)The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
7

(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by Information with two counts of Distribution
of a Controlled Substance, both first-degree-felonies. (R. 001). The Defendant
was arraigned and she pled not guilty and a jury trial wras held on November 16,
17 and 18, 2005. The jury found the Defendant guilty as charged. (R. 100). The
Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent terms of five years to life at the Utah
State Prison on January 13, 2006. (R. 110).

The Sentence, Judgment and

Commitment was entered on January 13, 2006. (R. 110-111). A notice of appeal
was filed on February 1, 2006. (R. 123).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Defendant was charged with two counts of distribution of a controlled
substance within a drug free zone, both first-degree felonies. The original charge
alleged oxycodone and Lortab as the drugs in question. On the morning of the
trial, based on new evidence discovered two days before trial began, the State
amended the one charge from an allegation of lortab to an allegation of
oxycodone. This change was objected to by defense counsel as being a surprise,
expert testimony, and counsel moved to prevent the amendment and to exclude
that evidence. (R. 139 / 82) It was determined that the State expert some eight
months prior to trial had conducted a test on the first drug and determined it to be
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oxycodone. The 2n drug was not tested and assumed to be lortab. Defense
counsel brought this problem to the prosecution, apparently at the time a
stipulation was being contemplated and the State rushed the other drug sample to
be tested. (R. 139 / 84) The defense objected to the entry of this evidence due to
the surprise nature of the expert testimony and the tardiness in bringing this to the
defendant's attention. The trial court ruled that the evidence could come into trial
over the defendant's objection (R. 139/91)
The allegation presented at trial involved two controlled purchases of
controlled substances from a confidential informant named Sean Henderson
(hereinafter referred to as C.L). The C.I. had previously been convicted of
several felony offenses including Burglary, Felony DUI, and forging a
prescription.

He had entered into an agreement with the State and the police

force to conduct several controlled purchases including the two at question here.
He had entered into an agreement with the county attorney and the police force
before these purchases. (R. 139 / 156) The gist of the agreement was that if the
C.L was able to make four prosecutable drug purchases, he would get out of jail
into a work release program and the State would make an affirmative
recommendation against prison on his felony convictions. (R. 139 / 157) In
accordance with these recommendations, the Defendant was at the time of trial
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out in a work release program and had been sentenced to probation rather than
prison.
On both April 4, 2005, and April 6, 2005, Officer Grogan met with and
searched the C.L and wired him with a hidden microphone. This search consisted
of searching readily assessable places in the car, and a search of the C.I.'s pockets
and shirt. The officer did not search his shoes, socks, etc. (R. 140 / 11, 12) Prior
to that search the C.L had made an arrangement with the Defendant to meet at a
Chevron parking lot. The Officer did not hear or record the original conversations
between the Defendant and the C.L. arranging for the meeting. (R. 140 / 15) The
Officer acknowledged that it was possible that the C.L had told the Defendant that
he would meet her at the gas station to pay her $100 that he owed her on a prior
work-related debt. (R. 140 / 16) The C.L then drove in his car to a Chevron
parking lot and met with the Defendant, who was driving a car registered to her.
(R. 139 / 166) Although the transactions were recorded by audiotape, and a
distant videotape, the Officer acknowledged that the he did not "hear anything on
the audio that says this is a drug deal." (R. 140/19)
The C.L testified that on the days in question he was searched, and then got
into the vehicle with Officer Dickson and drove to the Chevron parking lot. He
then left the vehicle and exchanged $100 for the drugs in question. (R. 140 / 69)
Officer Dickson testified that on the April 4th transaction he was sitting in the
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passenger seat of the truck driven by the CI. and observed the Defendant give to
the CI. "something white" and observed the CI. "hand the defendant money."
(R. 140 /125) On the April 6 transaction the officer could see the CI. lean into
the Defendant's car, but did not "actually see him passing stuff hand-to-hand".
(R. 140 / 130) A consent search of the Defendant's residence at the time of arrest
was conducted but nothing found at the residence was attributable to the
Defendant.
Dillon Argyle from the Utah Bureau of Forensic Services testified to
analyzing the two samples and determined that they were oxycodone. (R. 139 /
123) After deliberations, the jury returned with a verdict of guilty to both firstdegree felony charges.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant believes that there are two major errors committed by the
trial court that substantially impacted the outcome of the jury trial. First, the State
failed to provide any evidence that the alleged transactions occurred in a public
parking lot. Although the confidential informant as well as several of the strike
force officers testified that the transaction occurred in the Chevron parking lot,
they failed to provide any testimony that the parking lot was a public lot. There
may have been a private parking lot that the Defendant and the C.I. entered to
transact business, thereby taking the drug-free zone enhancement out of the hands

11

of the jury. Since defense counsel did not raise this issue by motion, there is a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in this case.
Second, the Defendant moved to exclude the testimony of the Utah Bureau
of Forensic Services chemist that the substance was alleged to be oxycodone in
Count II. This motion was founded on a violation by the State of UCA §77-17-13
and it's failure to give the required 30-day notice that their expert would be
testifying that the substance, alleged to be a controlled substance in Count II, was
in fact a controlled substance. The trial court denied this motion and also denied
a possible continuance that was discussed as an alternative.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1,
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION BY HER ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO
MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel
is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court
established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was
ineffective.

"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
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deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment;5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave
some guidance in noting, "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. at 688. Although
the Court in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor
form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance", Id. at 688, it did
mention certain minimal requirements. These duties include, "a duty of loyalty, a
duty to avoid conflicts of interest" as well as a duty "to consult with the defendant
on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important
developments in the course of the prosecution" Id. at 688. Additionally, the
overreaching requirement by the Supreme Court in ineffective assistance of
counsel cases is that the "performance inquiry must be whether counsel's
assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." Id. at 688.
Several other cases more specifically define when a defense counsel's
performance has slipped below the threshold cited above.
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365 (1986), the Court
was presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to conduct
proper discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress evidence under the
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Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court found the attorney's performance to be
deficient. The Court stated:
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the
defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict
would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to
demonstrate actual prejudice. Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S.
365, 375 (1986).
In making the determination that trial counsel's conduct failed to
comport with constitutional requirements, the Court held:
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct pretrial
discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only implausible
explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while generally
creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for this apparent
and pervasive failure to "make reasonable investigations or to make
a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations
unnecessary." [citation omitted] Under these circumstances, although
the failure of the District Court and the Court of Appeals to examine
counsel's overall performance was inadvisable, we think this
omission did not affect the soundness of the conclusion both courts
reached — that counsel's performance fell below the level of
reasonable professional assistance in the respects alleged.
Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 386 (1986).
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have
likewise rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can be
applied to the case where a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties.
In State v. Ison 2004 UT App 252 at T(19, 96 P.3d 374, this Court ruled that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to admit an administrative law judge's
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findings during a criminal trial, and further ruled that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to an erroneous jury instruction. In the case of State v. Ross
951 P.2d 236 (Utah App.,1997), this Court reversed the conviction of a defendant
based on the grounds that defense counsel was ineffective for not recognizing a
lesser included offense and in not making a motion to the court to reduce his
conviction based upon this lesser included offense. In that case the Court stated:
We conclude that counsel's assistance fell below an objective
standard of professional competence. We have already found
defendant's forgery convictions were improper, and thus we
conclude that counsel's failure was prejudicial. Accordingly, we hold
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, resulting in
eight improper convictions of the lesser-included offense of forgery.
(Id at 246)

In the present case, defense counsel failed to move for a directed verdict
after the State rested. Assuming arguendo that defense counsel failed to make a
motion to the trial court that the trial court would have granted, this failure, and
this failure alone would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under the
definition of Strickland and its Federal and State progeny. The general practice of
defense counsel in criminal trials is to move for a directed verdict or motion to
dismiss after the state has rested. This is especially true when the state has failed
to strongly establish one or more of the elements of the charge. In the case at bar,
the defense counsel made a motion to dismiss Count II at the beginning of trial
for the blatant violation by the prosecution of UCA §77-17-13; however, counsel
15

then failed to make a similar motion after the State had rested, when they relied
solely on the evidence that should have been excluded under the above
referenced statute.
Furthermore, defense counsel argued to the jury that the State had failed to
prove the Drug Free Zone element, yet failed to make a motion on similar
grounds to the trial court.

The charges for distribution were enhanced from

second-degree felonies to first-degree felonies solely on the grounds that the
transactions supposedly occurred in a "public parking lot or structure" (UCA §5837-8(4)(a)(viii)). While the Defendant acknowledges that the witnesses claimed
that the transaction occurred in the Chevron parking lot, there was absolutely no
evidence that the parking lot was a public lot. It is quite possible that the
transactions occurred behind the Chevron in a private parking lot on which both
the Defendant and the CI. were trespassing.
It is interesting to note that both the trial court and the prosecutor
acknowledged that one of the elements of the offense was the public parking lot.
(See R. 139 / 79 and 98) In fact the trial court stated to the jury as follows:
It's been called as to my attention that what their claim is in this
case is that the one element is that it occurred either in or within a
thousand feet of a public parking lot. Pm sure you'll hear more
about that later. (R. 139 / 79, emphasis added)
While there is no question that during the course of the trial several of the
witnesses mentioned or referred to the Chevron parking lot, nowhere is there any
16

testimony that this was a public parking lot. (See R. 139 / 159, 160, 161, 162,
164, 166, 167, 169, 175, 177, 180, 187, 188. Also, R. 140 / 16, 50, 53, 56, 69, 71,
74,79,93,124,126,)
In State v. Smith1, 2003 UT App 52, at f 33, 65 P. 3d 648, the Utah Court
of Appeals held, "[w]e conclude that trial counsel's failure to raise this lack of
evidence as a basis for dismissal of the charge is 4so deficient as to fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness/" (Citations omitted) In the present case
there is simply no reason for trial counsel not to move the court for a directed
verdict when the evidence against the Defendant should have been declared
inadmissible (as to the drug analysis) or totally deficient (as to the DFZ). This
failure clearly fulfills the first prong of the Stricklandtest.
The second prong of the test is whether "counsel's errors were so serious as
to deprive the Defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."
Strickland, at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.
In the case at bar, the evidence against the Defendant as to Count II of
necessity was based on the analysis of the forensic chemist. This is even more
fully established due to the admitted misidentification of the drug as Lortab by
both the CJ. and the officers involved.

Furthermore, there simply was no

evidence that the transaction occurred in a drug free zone. While the appellant

1

Reversed on other grounds, State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, 122 P.3d 615
17

acknowledges that the State referred to the Chevron parking lot, there is no
mention by any witness that this parking lot is a public parking lot. Although the
prosecutor tries to mention this several times during closing arguments, his
belated attempt to testify during closing is not evidence. Furthermore, defense
counsel objected to his characterization of the parking lot as a public parking lot.
(R. 140/177)
Based on the insufficient evidence, Defendant's counsel should have
moved the trial court to dismiss the case. Under Rule 17(p) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the trial court "may issue an order dismissing any
information ... upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense." Defense
counsel did not raise that possibility for the trial court to decide.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN
FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OF
AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTIONS
CASE FOR REASONS THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION.
In State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at^jll, 10 P.3d 346, the Utah Supreme
Court held, "as a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be
raised on appeal." However, this general rule is tempered when trial counsel's
performance falls below a reasonable standard. This Court further stated "[i]t
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necessarily follows that the trial court plainly errs if it submits the case to the jury
and thus fails to discharge a defendant when the insufficiency of the evidence is
apparent to the court." Id. at ]fl7 (emphasis added).
The Defendant recognizes the difficult burden he must overcome in
challenging a trial court's failure to dismiss for lack of evidence. The court's
power "to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient evidence is
limited." State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App 155, at f22, 3 P.3d 192. The Utah
Supreme Court has said,

cc

[s]o long as there is some evidence, including

reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the
crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v. Mead 2001 UT 58,
atf67, 27 P.3d 1115, (citations omitted). Additionally, in State v. Workman, 852
P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) the Court stated, cc[o]rdinarily, a reviewing court may
not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the
evidence in favor of the jury verdict."
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate Court
may overturn a conviction. In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's arrest of judgment from a conviction of sexual
exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based
solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of
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guilt/' In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence, expert or otherwise,
that the photograph in question could have been taken for purposes of sexual
arousal. Given that lack of evidence the Court vacated the defendant's guilty
verdict.
Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) the
Court reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second degree murder case
where the evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case there was undisputed
evidence that the victim had been murdered. The sole evidence against the
defendant consisted of the fact that the defendant was the last person seen with
the victim, and the fact that he had related a dream to three individuals in which
he recalled slapping the girl and that he "thought he hurt her. He thought he might
have killed her." Id. at 446. In that case, the Court also stated:
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to
the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as
far as it will go. But this does not mean that the court can take a
speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict.
The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 444445.
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 63 P.3d
94 the Utah Supreme Court, reversed the trial court's conviction of evidence
tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that opined that a
20

second, smaller knife had also been used in a murder of an individual No other
evidence as to a second weapon (the first weapon was recovered) was found; but
rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the defendant had the motive
and opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that conviction, the
Court held:
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the
defendants] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the
evidence supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had the
opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed it
ever existed. Id. at f 18.
This Court has held that the State is required to prove each element of an
offense beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a conviction. In the case of
Ogden City v. Edwards, 2004 UT App 468 at f5, 105 P.3d 949, this Court
reversed a conviction on the grounds of insufficient evidence holding:
Even if we assume that Ogden City proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that Defendant's buildings were "vacant," our review of the
record reveals that Ogden City did not prove that Defendant's
buildings were vacant "for more than ninety (90) days," or were
vacant and "contained] one or more 'public nuisance violations.5"
Ogden City Municipal Code § 16-8B-3(A). Because Ogden City did
not "prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable
doubt," (Citation omitted) we reverse.

While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence in
support of the jury's verdict, the Defendant submits that even with an extensive
marshaling of evidence the jury's verdict cannot be supported. It is undisputed
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that there were no witnesses who testified that the Chevron parking lot was a
public lot. The prosecutor did not ask and the trial court did not take judicial
notice of that essential fact. The evidence was only speculative that it was a
public parking lot, and a criminal conviction cannot be grounded upon
speculation.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT II OR
CONTINUE THE TRIAL BASED UPON A VIOLATION OF
UCA §77-17-13.
UCA §77-17-13 provides in relevant part:
(1) (a) if the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify
in a felony case at trial or any hearing ... the party intending to call the
expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but
not less than 30 days before trial.
The notice intended in this section includes information concerning the
expert's name, address, curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report if one
exists. The purpose for this section is to allow opposing counsel to be notified of
the expert witness, and to give opposing counsel an opportunity to contact that
witness and determine exactly what the witness intends to testify about and an
opportunity for opposing counsel to prepare for the examination, and possibly
retain a witness in rebuttal.
UCA §77-17-13(4)(a) provides the Defendant a remedy in the event of a
violation of this requirement by the prosecution. That subsection provides:
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If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with
the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if
necessary to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a
continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to
meet the testimony.
The Utah appellate courts have routinely held that compliance with UCA
§77-17-13 is mandatory. In the case of State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah
App. 1997), the court established a four-prong test to be used in reviewing a trial
court's denial of a motion for continuance due to a §77-17-13 violation. That test
is set forth as follows:
In reviewing the denial of appellant's request for continuance or
other relief, we consider four factors: (1) the extent of appellant's
diligence in his efforts to ready his defense prior to the date set for
trial; (2) the likelihood that the need for a continuance could have
been met if the continuance had been granted; (3) the extent to which
granting the continuance would have inconvenienced the court and
the opposing party; and (4) the extent to which the appellant might
have suffered harm as a result of the court's denial. (Citations
omitted)
In that case, the Court was presented with a factual situation, similar to the
case at bar, in which the prosecution during the first day of trial delivered some
clothing to the State crime lab for analysis. On the afternoon of the first day of
trial, the prosecution presented to the defense counsel with a report that the
analysis resulted in a finding of human blood on the clothing. The Defendant
then moved for the exclusion of the evidence or for a continuance of the trial.
The trial court denied both motions. During the in limine motion hearing, the
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prosecutor tried to argue that the proposed expert testimony was not prejudicial.
The Court of Appeals ruled to the contrary, making the following observation of
the trial court exchange in that hearing:
The prosecutor stated: cc[W]hether or not there is blood on the
panties is not a pivotal issue in this case, your honor." In response,
the trial judge correctly observed, with our emphasis, as follows:
Well, let me just tell you, as a prefatory matter / consider that
testimony critical It's one thing to have lay people say it looks like
blood. It's quite another thing to have the laboratory say it is in fact
blood. For a couple of reasons. One, it's objective. And number two,
its impact upon jurors is substantially different than having the
mother of the child say it looked like blood. (Id. at 531)
Based upon an analysis under the four-prong test, this Court reversed the
Defendant's conviction and remanded the case for new trial.
In the case of State v. Tolano, 2001 UT App 37, 19 P.3d 400, the Court was
presented with a case wherein the prosecution called two criminologists to testify
that the substance presented into evidence was in fact cocaine. The prosecution
had failed to provide the requisite notice to defense, and the Defendant objected
to the testimony, moved that the testimony be stricken, and requested a
continuance.

The trial court denied the continuance and the Utah Court of

Appeals held:
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
[defendant's] motion for continuance. First, [the defendant]
exercised appropriate diligence in his efforts to ready his defense
prior to the date set for trial... Second, it is likely that [the defendant]
could have been more adequately prepared to meet the expert
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testimony at trial if the court had granted the continuance... Third,
[the defendant's] right to the fair trial outweighed any inconvenience
to the court, the opposing party, and the jury that may have been
caused by a continuance... (Id. at fl 1)
Furthermore, the Court noted that according to the case of State v. Arellano, 964
P.2d 1167 (Utah App. 1998), The burden of establishing prejudice, is shifted to
the State. The court, quoting the Arellano decision, held, " therefore to establish
the prosecution's error was not prejudicial, the State must persuade the court that
there is no reasonable likelihood that absent the prosecutor's error, the outcome
would have been more favorable for the defendant". (Id at 404)
In the case of State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167 (Utah App. 1998), the Utah
Court of Appeals reiterated the fourth prong criteria set forth above in reviewing
expert witness testimony. In that case, the court was presented with a situation
wherein the State utilized the testimony of the State Crime Lab chemist to testify
regarding the identity of a controlled substance (cocaine). The State had utilized
this expert during the preliminary hearing, and then five days prior to trial
notified the Defendant that it intended to use that expert at trial. The trial court
denied the Defendant's motion to exclude the testimony , as well as the defense

2

State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah App. 1998), "Here, the trial court
did not find that the State acted in bad faith. Therefore, as to defendant's
argument that McNair's (State Crime Lab chemist) expert testimony should have
been excluded, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion to exclude McNair's testimony."
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motion for continuance.

The court concluded that there was uncontro verted

testimony that the Defendant had not been given the proper 30-day notice of the
proposed expert testimony, and therefore he was entitled to a continuance. The
Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion
for continuance, and remanded the case for new trial.
In State v. Tolano infra, the Court conducted a detailed analysis of the fourprong test set forth above. That analysis may be useful in examining the present
case, which is virtually identical and is therefore reviewed here. Under the first
prong, the Court found that
First, Tolano exercised appropriate diligence in his efforts to ready
his defense prior to the date set for trial. For example, Tolano
interviewed witnesses and made arrangements to have witnesses,
including his stepson from Mexico, testify on his behalf. In addition,
Tolano extensively cross-examined most of the State's witnesses,
Tolano made a chart outlining the area where the alleged offense
occurred, and Tolano arranged for an interpreter when necessary.
Finally, although Tolano was aware that the criminologists prepared
the toxicology report, "it is not defendant's duty to anticipate and
prepare for all potential, yet undisclosed expert witnesses. . . ."
Consequently, "defense counsel appears to have been fully prepared
to present defendant's case (Id at f 11 citations omitted)
Under the second prong, the court found:
Second, it is likely that Tolano could have been more adequately
prepared to meet the expert testimony if the trial court had granted
the continuance. Specifically, a continuance would have provided
Tolano with an opportunity to examine the testing procedures used
by the experts and compare them with other testing methods, hire his
own expert to challenge the testing procedures, and examine the
resumes of the experts and possibly impugn their qualifications.
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Therefore, "[a] continuance would have both provided defendant
more time to prepare to challenge [the experts'] testimony . . . and
then incorporate any new information into the defense strategy." (Id
at |12 citations omitted)
The third test, determining whether the inconvenience to the court,
opposing party and the jury is outweighed by the Defendant's right to fair trial,
the Court noted that "this court has specifically held that such an administrative
concern is outweighed by the appellant's right to fair trial" (Id. at f!3 citations
omitted)
The fourth factor, the harm the Defendant suffered as a result of the court's
denial for a motion to continue, is to some extent presumed by this Court. In State
v. Tolano infra the court held:
The final factor — the extent to which Tolano might have suffered
harm as a result of the court's denial — is the "'most important
among the factors.'" In Arellano, we recognized the difficult burden
placed on defendants to establish prejudice in cases such as these,
and we shifted the burden of proving prejudice from the defendant to
the State. See id. "Therefore, to establish that the prosecution's error
was not prejudicial, the State must persuade the court that there is no
reasonable likelihood that, absent the prosecution's error, the
outcome would have been more favorable for defendant." (Id. at |14
citations omitted)
In the case at bar, there is no question that all four prongs of the requisite
test had clearly been met. Under the first test, whether or not defense counsel had
adequately prepared for trial, all indication from reading the transcript of the trial
would indicate that is in fact the case. Defense counsel immediately objected to
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the proposed evidence, and the court conducted an inquiry as to the reasons for
the tardiness in providing this evidence to defense counsel. Defense counsel did
extensive cross-examination of various witnesses. There is no indication the
defense counsel was unprepared for trial . It is important to note in the present
case that defense counsel apparently is the one that brought the lack of a drug
analysis in Count II to the prosecution several days before trial. The fact that the
State intended to utilize the testimony of the same expert as they had on Count I
does not somehow cure this problem. Furthermore, "it is not defendant's duty to
anticipate and prepare for all potential, yet undisclosed expert witnesses."( State
v. Tolano a t f l l )
Considering the second prong, "it is likely that [the defendant] could been
more adequately prepared to meet the expert testimony if the trial court had
granted the continuance."

Furthermore, a continuance would have allowed

defense counsel "an opportunity to examine the testing procedures used by the
experts and compare them with other testing methods, hire his own expert to
challenge the testing procedures, and examine the resumes of the experts and
possibly impugn their qualifications." (Id at fl2 citations omitted) In the present
case, there was some testimony from the State's own witnesses that the substance

3

Being prepared for trial and being ineffective during trial are two different
things. Counsel may be prepared for trial, but may miss crucial objections and fail
to file case dismissing motions, and therefore ineffective.
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in question was Lortab (as originally charged). The expert concluded, contrary to
the Shopko pharmacist, that the drug in question was oxycodone. Additional time
to hire an expert may have been crucial to the defense case.
The third issue, with regards to inconvenience to the trial court, opposing
counsel, or the jury, there is no question that the Defendant's right to a fair trial
clearly outweighs administrative concerns. Furthermore, since it is the State that
failed to provide notice as required under §77-17-13, it would be disingenuous for
the state to thereafter argue that it has been inconvenienced by the Defendant's
timely objection.
The final prong, harm to the Defendant, has clearly been established. Just
as in all of the cases cited above, the expert testimony that the substance in
question was oxycodone as opposed to Tylenol was pivotal to the prosecution's
case. If the prosecutor were unable to establish the identity of the substance, the
case would fail. Without the expert testimony of the chemist the Defendant would
not have been convicted on Count II.
The fourth, and final prong of the §77-17-13 test is the burden of
establishing the lack of harm to the Defendant. As mentioned above, this has
been placed on the prosecution, and it is the Defendant's position that the
prosecution cannot meet that burden. There is no question that if the jury had not
heard the evidence regarding the identity of the substance in question, the jury
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would have been unable to make a determination that it was a controlled
substance. There can be no question that the identity of an alleged drug is "not a
fact within the common knowledge of the jury" ( State v. Carter, 707 P2d. 656,
662 (Utah 1985), particularly where even the strike force officer and the Shopko
pharmacist apparently made an erroneous identification.

Since the jury was

relegated to rely upon the State Crime Lab chemist for the identity of the
substance, the Defendant was clearly prejudiced by the §77-17-13 violation.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the Defendant's conviction on Count II as being improperly obtained by
the use of surprise expert testimony. With regards to Count I (and Count II if the
above relief is not granted), the Defendant respectfully request the case be
reduced to a second-degree felony due to the State's failure to establish the drug
free zone element of the offense.
DATED this J_ day of September 2006
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Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/18/2005 Guilty
2. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/18/2005 Guilty
HEARING
This is before the Court for sentencing. Defendant
present in custody fiom the Weber County Jail. Court finds
no legal basis why sentence should not be imposed.
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Case No: 051902361
Date:
Jan 09, 2006
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO
DIST C/S a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be
life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE /OFFER/ARRANGE TO
DIST C/S a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not: less than five years and which may be
life in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to rhe Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Prison terms imposed to run concurrently with one another.

Credit is granted for time served.

ROGER S/l)UTSON
"
District Court Judge
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ADDENDUM B

ADDENDUM B

U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8. Prohibited acts-Penalties
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or
dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation
of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert
with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of
organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or
gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and
upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree
felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a
second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of
fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76- 10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his
person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to
run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony
punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and which
may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the
person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B-Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order,

directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as
otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement,
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be
occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription
or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third
degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of the
plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a
conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of
marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or
any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree
greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled
substances as listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a
term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his body any
measurable amount of a controlled substance; and

(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing
serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another,
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in his body:
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in
Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-374(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) Prohibited acts C-Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license
number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the
purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other
authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration
of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be
attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his receiving
any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge,
alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false
name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or
to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the
terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to
print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint,
or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D-Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter
37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled
Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this
Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those
schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds
of any of those schools or institutions;

(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which
are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or
institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10- 501;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or
parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i)
through (viii);
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of
where the act occurs; or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or
distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of any
correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be
imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have
been established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less than
a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this Subsection (4)
is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. This
Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g).
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi):
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided
by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person wrho, acting with the
mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits,
requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a
violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location
where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the
location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor.

(6)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any
civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.

(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state,
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar
to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person
or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance
or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the
character of the substance or substances.

(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his
professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or
orderly under his direction and supervision.

(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses an
imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his employment.
(10)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as
defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1 )(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona fide
traditional ceremonial puiposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion
as defined in Subsection 58- 37-2(1 )(w).
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used,
possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion.
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense
under this Subsection (10) as soon as practicable, but not later than ten days prior to trial,
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense,
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause
shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice,
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (10) by a
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to the
charges.
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.

ADDENDUM C

Rule 17. The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel
The defendant shall be personally present at the trial with the following exceptions
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial in
his absence,
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from
the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried
and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been
present, and
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause shown which may
include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal attendance of the
defendant at the trial
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody,
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody,
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance, and
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in open court with
the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes written demand at
least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise No jury shall be allowed in the trial of
an infraction
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in Section 78-46-5,
U C A 1953
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the accused and the approval
of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally in open court, proceed to trial or complete a
trial then in progress with any number of jurors less than otherwise required
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the following order

(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated,
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the defense may make an
opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has rested,
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge,
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case,
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause,
otherwise permits,
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the
jury, and
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides without argument, the
prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by
responding to the defense argument The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of
counsel for each party and the time to be allowed for argument
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror has been
selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate juror If no alternate has been selected, the
parties may stipulate to proceed with the number of jurors remaining Otherwise, the jury shall
be discharged and a new trial ordered
(i) Questions by jurors A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to a witness as
provided in this section
(1) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the process to ensure
the jury maintains its role as the impartial finder of fact and does not become an investigative
body The judge may disallow any question from a juror and may discontinue questions from
jurors at any time
(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise the jurors that they
may write the question as it occurs to them and submit the question to the bailiff for transmittal
to the judge The judge should advise the jurors that some questions might not be allowed
(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented parties and rule upon any
objection to the question The judge may disallow a question even though no objection is made
The judge shall preserve the written question in the court file If the question is allowed, the
judge shall ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it The question
may be rephrased into proper form The judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to
examine the witness after the juror's question
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, it may

order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be
shown to them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be
sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with the trial and to
return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a specified time.
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are sequestered,
they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse among themselves or to
converse with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the
trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.
(1) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the court and all
exhibits which have been received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of
the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or
contraband. The court shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to
take notes during the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As necessary,
the court shall provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the jury on taking and using
notes.
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together in some convenient
place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the court, the officer having them under his
charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to
ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered,
communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on any point of law
arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such
request to the court. The court may then direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in
the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise
the jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be recorded. The court
may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the
court, in which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in the record.
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be corrected by the jury under
the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again.
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence,
the court may issue an order dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof,
upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein
or any lesser included offense.
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NOW, I ALLOW JURORS TO SPREAD OUT A LITTLE BIT IF YOU'D
LIKE DURING THE TRIAL, YOU CAN MOVE AROUND, BUT WE JUST KIND
OF LIKE TO KEEP YOU IN THE SAME ORDER AT LEAST AS YOU ARE
NOW.
ALSO, I DO ALLOW PEOPLE AND —

ON A JURY TO BRING IN

COFFEE OR DIET COKES OR REGULAR COLA DRINKS TO KEEP YOU
ALERT, IF YOU WISH, BUT I DON'T ALLOW THE CANS TO COME IN.
YOU HAVE TO BRING THEM IN IN CUPS TO KIND OF KEEP IT LOOKING
A LITTLE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR A COURTROOM.
JURORS THAT RIGHT.

AND SO I ALLOW

AND THE BAILIFF WILL SHOW YOU WHERE THE

POP AND EVERYTHING IS BACK THERE.
ADDITIONALLY, IF YOU START GETTING A LITTLE DOZY AT ANY
TIME BECAUSE YOU ATE A LITTLE MUCH OR YOU JUST HAD A FITLESS
SLEEP THE NIGHT BEFORE, FEEL FREE TO STAND UP AND STRETCH AND
MOVE AROUND INDIVIDUALLY AND, YOU KNOW, TO KIND OF KEEP YOU
ALERT.

SO IT'S BETTER TO BE A LITTLE EMBARRASSED BY HAVING

TO STAND UP AND SHAKE IT OFF THAN IT IS TO FALL ASLEEP.
OKAY?
NOW YOU MAY BE EXCUSED FOR THE LUNCH BREAK.
(THE JURY LEAVES THE COURTROOM.)
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

YOU MAY BE SEATED.

MAKE A RECORD ON A NUMBER OF THINGS.

WE NEED TO

THE FIRST PECORD THAT I

THINK THE DEFENSE WANTED TO MAKE REGARDING —

WAS REGARDING

THE AMENDMENT OF THE CHARGE TODAY BEFORE WE GOT STARTED, FROM
LORTAB IN COUNT 2 TO OXYCODONE.

WOULD YOU LIKE TO MAKE YOUR

RECORD ON THAT NOW?
MR. CRAGUN:

I WOULD, YOUR HONOR.

THE DEFENSE JUST

WANTS TO OBJECT TO THE FACT THAT, NUMBER ONE, WE'VE PREPARED
OUR DEFENSE SURROUNDING THE FACT THE STATE HAS CALLED LORTAB
IN COUNT 2, AND IN FACT THEY'RE NOW ALLEGING AS OF THE DAY OF
THE HEARING THAT IT'S OXYCODONE.
THOSE ARE TWO DIFFERENT DRUGS.

OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT

THAT THEY DON'T HAVE ANY

WITNESS THAT THEY'VE LISTED OR THAT THE JURY'S HEARD OF THAT
WOULD BE ABLE TO TESTIFY AS TO THE DIFFERENCE IN THAT. AND
10

THE OFFICERS WOULD NOT QUALIFY AS EXPERT TEST —

11

WITNESSES FOR THE PURPOSE OF TESTIFYING IF THERE'S A

12

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OXYCODONE AND LORTAB.

OR EXPERT

13

THE COURT:

WHAT'S THE STATE RESPONSE TO THAT?

14

MR. MILES:

YOUR HONOR, THE STATE HAS A RIGHT TO AMEND

15

THE INFORMATION EVEN UP UNTIL ABOUT THE TIME OF THE VERDICT.

16

AND THIS IS AN AMENDMENT THAT ISN'T OUTSIDE THE REALM.

17

SAW THAT WE PROVIDED COUNSEL, AS SOON AS WE HAD IT, WITH THE

18

LAB RESULTS WHICH ALLEGED OXYCODONE ON THE SECOND SUBSTANCE

19

WHICH WE HAD CHARGED AS LORTAB

20

IDENTIFIED AS OXYCODONE.

21

ALLOWED TO PROCEED UNDER FOR BOTH SINCE THAT'S WHA11 WE'VE

22

TESTED AND VERIFIED, SO WE DON 'T NEED TO REACH THE ISSUE OF

23

WHO'S QUALIFIED TO TESTIFY ABOUT WHAT THE SUBSTANCES, WHETHER

24

THEY'RE IN THE SAME FAMILY OF SUBSTANCES, ARE.

25

IS STILL ILLEGAL IN ANY SENSE.

YOU

THE SUBSTANCE HAS BEEN

THAT 'S THE COUNT I THINK WE'RE

THE; CONDUCT
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THE COURT:

LET ME ASK THE DEFENSE, WHAT KIND OF

PROBLEMS HAS THIS CREATED FOR YOU IN YOUR ACTUAL DEFENSE OF
THE CASE THAT PUTS YOU AT ANY TYPE OF A DISADVANTAGE?
MR. CRAGUN:

YOUR HONOR, THERE'S SEVERAL ISSUES, THE

FIRST OF WHICH IS WE'D LIKE, YOU KNOW, OUR OWN EXPERT TO COME
IN AND TESTIFY.

IF YOU LOOK —

AND AGAIN, IT HASN'T BEEN

PRESENTED TO THE COURT, THE BIGGEST PROBLEM THEY HAVE IS IF
THEIR INFORMATION'S KEPT AT LORTAB, THEY HAVE NO DRUG TEST
THAT SHOWS LORTAB, PERIOD.

THEY HAVE TWO TESTS ON TWO

DIFFERENT DRUGS THAT SHOW OXYCODONE.

THEY ALSO HAVE THOSE

SAME TWO TESTS THAT SAY THAT THE OTHER PILLS CAME BACK
UNIDENTIFIED.

THAT CREATES A HUGE PROBLEM FOR THE STATE.

THE COURT:

WELL, IT MAY CREATE A PROBLEM FOR THE STATE

IF THEY HAD PROCEEDED WITH LORTAB, BUT I'M WONDERING WHAT IS
THE PROBLEM OTHER THAN THE POSSIBILITY THAT YOU'LL BE
CONVICTED —

YOUR CLIENT WOULD BE CONVICTED OF POSSESSING

OXYCODONE RATHER THAN LORTAB.

IN OTHER WORDS, AS YOU PREPARE

YOUR DEFENSE, HOW DOES THE FACT THAT —

OTHER THAN WHAT

YOU'VE STATED, THAT THEY COULDN'T PROVE LORTAB, HOW DOES THAT
AFFECT YOUR ABILITY TO PREPARE A DEFENSE TO THAT DRUG?
211

MR. CRAGUN:

AND PART OF ~

PART OF OUR PROBLEM THERE,

22

YOUR HONOR, I DON'T KNOW WHEN THAT SECOND SET OF DRUGS WAS

23

TESTED, BUT THE DATE THAT THE -- THINK IT WAS DILLON ARGYLE,

24

THAT THE DATE THAT HE'S SHOWING THAT HE —

25

FAXED IT OVER TO ME, WAS NOVEMBER 14TH.

AT LEAST WHEN HE
THIS TOOK PLACE BACK
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1

IN MAY.

2

CHANCE TO CONSULT WITH EXPERTS TO SEE HOW IT WOULD AFFECT OUR

3

DEFENSE.

4

THEIR POSSESSION FOR EIGHT MONTHS AND ONLY TESTED IT MONDAY,

5

THAT AGAIN CAUSES US SOME SEVERE JEOPARDY IN MY CLIENT BEING

6

CONVICTED ON THAT LORTAB.

7I

THAT WAS MONDAY OF THIS WEEK.

I MEAN IF THIS DRUG —

THE COURT:

WE HAVEN'T HAD A

AND IF THEY'VE HAD IT IN

WHAT'S THE DATE OF YOUR —

OF YOUR LAB TEST

THAT'S APPARENTLY BEEN STIPULATED TO COME IN; IS THAT
CORRECT?
101

MR. MILES:

THAT WAS OUR STIPULATION, THAT IS CORRECT,

11

YOUR HONOR.

WE HAD AN ORIGINAL LAB REPORT DONE AND TESTING

12

WAS DONE BACK ON MAY 27TH OF THIS YEAR.

13

FOR -- ONE OF THE COUNTS, HOWEVER, WAS NOT TESTED AT THAT

14

TIME.

15

DILLON ARGYLE TESTED IT, IT LOOK LIKES NOVEMBER 14TH.

16

WAS MONDAY.

17

HAD MADE ME AWARE OF, SO THAT'S WHY WE RUSHED THE LAB RESULTS

18

AND I GOT THEM TO HIM AS SOON AS I REASONABLY COULD.

19

WAS A SITUATION WE WERE AWARE OF PRIOR TO ENTERING TRIAL.

20

THAT WAS GOING TO BE A PROBLEM, I GUESS, WHY DIDN'T WE ASK

21

FOR A CONTINUANCE TO SEE WHAT EXACTLY CAME BACK AND SEE WHAT

WHAT THE DRUGS

WE HAD THEM SUBMIT THAT LAST WEEK TO HAVE IT TESTED.

THIS IS SOMETHING MR. CRAGUN WAS AWARE OF AND

22 I EFFECT THAT WOULD HAVE HAD ON THEIR DEFENSE.
FOR ANY OF THAT.
24 1
25

THAT

THE COURT:

SO THIS
IF

THEY DIDN'T ASK

THEY JUST WANTED THE LABS.
SO I UNDERSTAND THIS, ONE OF THE DRUGS FROM

THE FIRST PURCHASE ON APRIL THE 4TH WAS SENT TO THE LAB.

85

MR. MILES:

CORRECT.

THE COURT:

EARLY.

MR. MILES: YES.
THE COURT:

AND THE RESULT CAME BACK QUITE SOME TIME AGO

SHOWING IT WAS OXYCODONE.
MR. MILES:

CORRECT.

THE COURT:

THEN WHEN YOU LEARNED THAT THE -- THERE WAS

NO RESULT ON THE DRUG FROM THE 6TH OF APRIL.

YOU SENT THAT

IN RECENTLY.
MR. MILES:

LAST WEEK.

THE COURT:

LAST WEEK TO GET IT TESTED.

AND THE RESULT

CAME BACK AS OXYCODONE RATHER THAN LORTAB.
MR. MILES:

CORRECT.

THE COURT:

AND YOU JUST GOT THAT MONDAY OF THIS WEEK

AND PROVIDED THAT TO COUNSEL ONLY AFTER YOU GOT IT.
MR. MILES:

AS SOON AS I GOT IT, WITHIN MINUTES.

THE COURT:

THEN THAT GAVE RISE TO YOUR REASON FOR THE

MOTION TO AMEND THIS MORNING.
MR. MILES:

CORRECT.

COUNSEL HAD BROUGHT MY ATTENTION

TO THE FACT THAT WE HAD ALLEGED LORTAB WHEN THE LAB REPORT
211 STATED OXYCODONE.
22

THE COURT:

ON THE ONE DRUG.

23

MR. MILES:

CORRECT.

24 I

MR. CRAGUN:
THE COURT:

AND SO —

CAN I ADDRESS THAT, YOUR HONOR?
YEAH, GO AHEAD.
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MR. CRAGUN:

1

MY BIG CONCERN IS SHE'S BEEN LANGUISHING IN

2

JAIL FOR NEARLY EIGHT MONTHS AND THEY NEVER BOTHERED TO RUN A

3

TEST ON THOSE SECOND SET OF DRUGS.

4

FACT WOULD HAVE RESOLVED THIS IF THERE WAS ONLY ONE COUNT.

5

AND :IT'S PREJUDICED MY CLIENT TO THE EXTENT SHE'S NOW SAT IN

6

JAIL FOR EIGHT MONTHS.
THE COURT:

7
8

WELL, BUT THEY'RE TWO SEPARATE INCIDENTS.

THAT HASN'T CHANGED, HAS IT?
MR. MILES:

9

NO, YOUR HONOR.

10

MR. CRAGUN:

NO.

11

THE COURT:

OKAY.

12

MR. CRAGUN:

13

INCIDENT.

14

ONE.

15

WE MOST LIKELY AND IN

AND I BELIEVE WE CAN PROCEED ON THE ONE

I JUST DON'T SEE HOW WE CAN PROCEED ON THE SECOND

THE COURT:

WELL, YOU'RE NOT SURPRISED THAT THEY'RE

16

GOING TO TRY AND PROVE THAT THERE WAS A DISTRIBUTION OF A --

17

AN ILLEGAL DRUG ON THE 6TH OF APRIL; THAT'S ALWAYS BEEN THE

18

CLAIM, RIGHT?

19

MR. CRAGUN:

20

THE COURT:

21

LORTAB OR OXYCODONE.

22

PREPARATION FOR TRIAL BY HAVING THAT COME UP JUST THIS WEEK.

23
24
25

MR. CRAGUN:

THAT'S UNDERSTOOD.
THE ONLY QUESTION IS WHETHER THAT IS — WAS
AND YOU SAY THAT DISADVANTAGES YOU IN

THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.

IF THIS WAS

SOMETHING —
THE COURT:

AND WHAT —

WHAT WOULD YOU EXPECT THEN AN
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EXPERT MIGHT HELP YOU ON?
MR. CRAGUN:

WE DON'T KNOW BECAUSE WE AREN'T ABLE TO

TALK TO AN EXPERT TO EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LORTAB
AND OXYCODONE.

AND NEITHER ARE THEY.

THE COURT:

WELL, BUT --

MR. CRAGUN:

AND IT'S NOT OUR JOB TO GO PROVE THE

STATE'S PART OF THE CASE.
THE COURT:
SAYING.

WELL, I'M NOT SURE I UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU'RE

REPEAT THEN HOW THAT DISADVANTAGES YOU.

MR. CRAGUN:
THE COURT:

YOUR HONOR, IN PREPARING

—

YOU WOULD -- TELL ME WHAT YOU WOULD HAVE

DONE DIFFERENTLY.
MR. CRAGUN:

ON COUNT 2, THE STATE ALLEGED LORTAB.

FACT, IT WAS OXYCODONE.

IN

IT WAS OXYCODONE, BUT BECAUSE THAT

WAS NOT ALLEGED UNTIL MONDAY OF THIS WEEK, AND IN FACT THIS
MORNING, BECAUSE I ONLY BECAME AWARE OF IT THIS MORNING, WE
COULD HAVE CONSULTED WITH EXPERTS TO SEE WHAT OUR DEFENSE
WOULD BE.

WE WOULDN'T KNOW WHAT IT WOULD BE UNTIL WE TALKED

TO THE EXPERT.
THE COURT:

SO YOU THINK YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO SHOW THERE

WAS CONFUSION SOMEWHERE ABOUT EXACTLY WHAT THIS DRUG WAS THAT
MIGHT RAISE REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE JURY S MIND -MR. CRAGUN:
THE COURT:

WE WOULD RAISE -IF YOU —- IF YOU HAD BEEN ABLE TO

PPOPERLY PREPARE AND PERHAPS CHALLENGE WHY DID YCU CHARGE IT
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1

AS LORTAB THEN IF YOU'RE NOW CLAIMING IT WAS OXYCODONE.
MR. CRAGUN:

2

IT CONFUSED THE STATE, IT CONFUSED THE

3

OFFICERS, AND IN FACT, IT CONFUSED THE —

4

BACK CONFUSED BECAUSE HALF THE PILLS THEY COULDN'T

5

IDENTIFY --

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. CRAGUN:

8

THE COURT:

13

-- AND THE OTHER HALF THEY'RE SAYING'S

-- I UNDERSTAND.

YOU CAN GET THE LAB

TECHNICIAN HERE FOR TRIAL.
MR. MILES:

11
12

WELL --

OXYCODONE.

9
10

EVEN THE LAB CAME

COME

WE CAN TRY.

I TOLD HIM HE DON'T HAVE TO

—
THE COURT:

THAT WOULD GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY PERHAPS

14

TO QUESTION, YOU KNOW, HOW -- WHY THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A

15

CLAIM ORIGINALLY OF --

16

MR. CRAGUN:

AND IF THEY DO BRING IN THE LAB TECHNICIAN,

17

I HAVE SOME CONCERNS BECAUSE HIS OR HER NAME WAS NOT BROUGHT

18

UP TO THE JURY AS A POTENTIAL WITNESS.

19

MR. MILES:

IT MIGHT ALSO REQUIRE THE STATE TO CALL ONE

20

ADDITIONAL WITNESS, YOUR HONOR, AND THAT'S RANDY LYTHGOE.

21

PART OF THE REASON FOR THE MIXUP, IF I CAN OFFER WHAT SORT OF

22

HAPPENED A LITTLE BIT, IS THAT RANDY LYTHGOE HAD A LITTLE

23

DRUG BIBLE THAT HE LOOKED UP THE MARKINGS IN, AND THEY

24

PRELIMINARILY IDENTIFIED ' rHEM AS LORTAB AND OXYCODONE.

25

THEN SENT THEM OFF TO THE LAB AND THE LAB CAME BACK THAT

WE
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THEY'RE BOTH OXYCODONE.

BUT WE HAD CHARGED IN THE MEANTIME

LORTAB AND OXYCODONE, AND SO TO EXPLAIN THAT TO THE JURY, WE
MAY HAVE TO CALL RANDY LYTHGOE AS WELL.
MR. CRAGUN:

AGAIN, THE JURY HASN'T HEARD HIS NAME. WE

HAVEN'T -- I MEAN WE DON'T EVEN KNOW WHAT HE'LL TESTIFY TO
OTHER THAN NOW HE'S SAYING WHAT HE'D TESTIFY -THE COURT:

WHO IS THE LAB TECHNICIAN?

MR. MILES:

DILLON ARGYLE.

THE COURT:

WHAT?

MR. MILES:

DILLON ARGYLE.

THE COURT:

WELL, DURING THE LUNCH HOUR, I WANT YOU TO

HE SHOULD BE ON THE —

PERHAPS EXAMINE WHETHER OR NOT YOU WANT TO CALL THEM IN. I
THINK I NEED TO ALLOW THE DEFENSE TO RAISE THE ISSUE
CONCERNING WHAT THE CONFUSION IS, YOU KNOW, BECAUSE THEY WERE
TOLD IT WAS LORTAB AND ONLY THIS WEEK HAVE LEARNED -- WAS IT
JUST TODAY WAS THE FIRST YOU'VE LEARNED OR WAS IT EARLIER?
MR. CRAGUN:
MR. MILES:
MR. CRAGUN:

I BELIEVE WE GOT A FAX YESTERDAY OR -LET ME SEE.
WE GOT A FAX.

THE FIRST I WAS ABLE TO SEE

IT WAS AT FOUR O'CLOCK THIS MORNING WHEN I REALIZED WHAT HAD
TAKEN PLACE.
THE COURT:
MR. CRAGUN:
THE COURT:
MR. CRAGUN:

FOUR O'CLOCK THIS MORNING?
I WAS HERE BRIGHT AND EARLY.
OKAY.
NOT HERE; IN MY OFFICE.
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1
2
3

MR. MILES:

WE FAXED IT YESTERDAY, YOUR HONOR, AT 10

THE COURT:

OKAY.

A.M.
AND YOU ONLY SAW THAT AS YOU WERE

4

REVIEWING ALL THE EVIDENCE THIS MORNING IN YOUR FINAL

5

PREPARATION.

6

MR. CRAGUN:

THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.

AND JUST SO

7

THE COURT'S CLEAR, MR. MILES DID FAX TO US EARLIER THE APRIL

8

4TH MATERIALS PROBABLY THREE WEEKS AGO.

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. CRAGUN:

11

THE COURT:

SO YOU DON'T HAVE ANY ARGUMENT ABOUT THAT.
NO.
BUT EARLIER YOU HAD STIPULATED THAT THE LAB

12

REPORTS COULD COME IN, AND NOW YOU'VE GOT A PROBLEM BECAUSE

13

THEY'VE CHANGED THE DRUG.

14

MR. CRAGUN:

15

THE COURT:

16

CHANGED THE REPORT.
WELL, THEY'VE CHANGED THE —

THEY'VE

DETERMINED IT'S OXYCODONE RATHER THAN LORTAB.

17

MR. CRAGUN:

18

THE COURT:

YEAH.
AND YOU'LL NEED TO SEE IF YOU CAN GET RANDY

19

LYTHGOE.

20

N O T S U R E IT'S E N O U G H T H A T YOU —

21

WITH THE SECOND COUNT, BUT I DO THINK THAT TO INSURE FAIRNESS

22

THAT THEY OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO RAISE THE CONFUSION ISSUE

23

BECAUSE YOU'RE CLAIMING OXYCODONE.

24
25

I THINK T H E R E ' S

SOME V A L I D I T Y TO T H E A R G U M E N T .
THE STATE C O U L D N O T

PROCEED

NOW, I'M NOT SURE IT'S TWO CENTS' WORTH OF DIFFERENCE
BECAUSE THEY'RE BOTH ILLEGAL DRUGS.

I'M

THAT'S THE STATE'S
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ARGUMENT.
MR. CRAGUN:
THE COURT:

I UNDERSTAND.
AND I'M NOT SURE THAT BECAUSE OF THAT THAT

IT'S GOING TO MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE, BUT I THINK, YOU KNOW,
WHEN A DEFENSE IS TRYING TO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
VALIDITY OF THE STATE'S EVIDENCE, THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN A FREE
HAND TO RAISE EVERY POSSIBLE REASONABLE ISSUE.

AND THAT'S

YOUR ARGUMENT.
MR. CRAGUN:
THE COURT:

THAT'S CORRECT.
I'M GOING TO TAKE THAT UNDER ADVISEMENT

STILL, BUT WE'LL -- YOU KNOW, I'VE RULED ON IT PRELIMINARILY.
THAT'S THE WAY IT'S GOING TO REMAIN, BUT I WILL AT LEAST
LEAVE IT OPEN.

I WANT TO SEE IF THERE'S ANY PROBLEM IF WE

CALL THESE TWO WITNESSES WITH THIS JURY.
MR. MILES:

IN TERMS OF ALLOWING THE AMENDMENT TO THE

INFORMATION?
THE COURT:

YEAH, UH-HUH.

YOU KNOW, IF WE'VE GOT JURORS

THAT ARE VERY CLOSE FRIENDS WITH THE TWO ADDITIONAL WITNESSES
THAT MIGHT BE CALLED, THEN THAT MAY CREATE A PROBLEM.

I

THINK I NEED TO ASK THEM THAT BEFORE WE GET FURTHER ALONG.
211

OKAY.

NOW, THE OTHER QUESTION I HAVE CONCERNS THE JURY

22

IMPANELMENT.

THE RECORD WILL REFLECT THAT AT THE BENCH

23

DURING A BENCH OUT-OF-THE-JURY PANEL HEARING, THE COURT

24

DENIED CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE BY THE DEFENSE OF RAY MCDONOUGH,

25

CARY MECHAM, AND --

